Reorienting
Global
Communication

INDIAN AND CHINESE
MEDIA BEYOND BORDERS

Edited by

*Michael Curtin and
Hemant Shah*

Contents

Illustrations

Introduction

Before its New York opening on April 30, 2007, *Spider-Man 3* had already premiered in nine countries, including Russia, Brazil, and Japan. So important is the global market for Hollywood blockbusters these days that studios now pay substantial attention to international promotion and distribution. During its theatrical run, *Spider-Man 3* raked in more than $500 million from the overseas box office, a figure far exceeding ticket sales in the United States. Consequently, it's somewhat understandable that reflections on the globalization of media often begin and end with reference to the seemingly pervasive presence of Hollywood movies around the world. In dollar figures, the raw power of American movies is undeniable, with films such as *Spider-Man 3* bringing in some $900 million worldwide.

What these numbers don't convey, however, is the relatively modest reach of these blockbusters. Given the premium price of Hollywood movie tickets, the number of people who actually saw *Spider-Man 3* in a movie theater was only 125 million worldwide. Compare this to the Indian superhero movie *Krrish*, which premiered only a few months earlier. In India alone, it sold an estimated 110 million tickets. Worldwide figures are hard to come by, since Indian movie companies have far less control of overseas markets, but one can imagine that audiences in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Gulf States were similarly enthusiastic, as were audiences in markets where Hollywood ticket prices are beyond the reach of the average citizen. Based on this comparison, one might reasonably presume that *Krrish*'s cultural impact was on a par with *Spider-Man 3*. In fact, it is quite likely that *Krrish* reached more cinemagoers than its Hollywood counterpart, as is commonly the case with Indian blockbusters these days. The spatial location of Indian movie audiences may differ, but one could certainly argue that *Krrish* is something of a global phenomenon in its own right.

Krrish is also a global movie in another sense, for it was conceived and produced by a Mumbai (a.k.a. Bombay) studio with transnational audiences in mind. This was not always the case with Indian movies, but since the mid-1990s, overseas viewers with familial attachments to the subcontinent have come to figure prominently in the strategies of so-called Bollywood filmmak-

ers and distributors. *Krrish* sold only $1.5 million movie tickets in the United States, but that's largely because it's extremely difficult for foreign movies to get screen time in the crowded American market. Therefore, video sales and online fandom offer a better measure of popularity. According to Yash Raj Films, one of Mumbai's most successful studios, Indian movies generate more $100 million per year in U.S. video and soundtrack sales, making it the most lucrative growth market for the Indian movie industry. It's also estimated that the volume of pirated materials is even larger. In the early 1990s, overseas markets for Indian movies were relatively inconsequential. Today they represent one of the most important parts of the business and, as a result, global perspectives have come to influence the conception and execution of many Indian films.

Chinese movies are undergoing a similar transformation. *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon* is a spectacular example of this shift, but just as intriguing are films such as *Kung-Fu Hustle*, starring Hong Kong's Stephen Chow, which earned more than $100 million in theaters worldwide, and *Hero*, starring China's Jet Li, which earned $177 million. All three of these films not only captured the attention of audiences around the world but were also the product of a multinational collaboration, drawing upon finance, talent, and creative resources from Chinese societies around the world. Again, box-office revenues tell only part of the story, as these films earned much of their income in markets with lower ticket prices than their Western counterparts.

Chinese television is also becoming more transnational. In 1991, Hong Kong entrepreneurs launched Star TV, hoping to create a pan-Asian platform of satellite TV programming, but instead Star helped to spark the deregulation of television industries throughout the region—thereby instigating lively competition for the attention of viewers. Today, Star is owned by a Western conglomerate that competes with other Western conglomerates for a stake in Chinese TV, but just as importantly, Asian media companies that used to operate national or local television stations in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taipei now run television services that operate throughout the region. Facing growing competition in their deregulated local markets, these companies have been prodded to expand their geographical reach, not only throughout Asia but also to cities in Europe and North America where Chinese audiences can now access tens of thousands of hours of programming via cable, satellite, and home video.

Over the past twenty years, market forces, technological innovation, and government deregulation have engendered new conditions for the produc-

tion and distribution of commercial Chinese television. Even in the People's Republic of China (PRC), where the state owns all television stations and cable systems, the number of services and the range of competitors have increased dramatically. And although state ownership remains the standard, television institutions have faced dramatic reductions in state subsidies, forcing them to rely on advertising revenues and new entrepreneurial initiatives. This has resulted in joint ventures with commercial television partners from such places as Taipei, Tokyo, and New York, and it has even encouraged the Beijing-based national network, CCTV—which is the only television service officially authorized to operate abroad—to forge distribution agreements that for the first time give it carriage in Europe and North America. Media experts say it's only a matter of time before restrictions loosen further, allowing other PRC broadcasters to extend their reach overseas. Building in part on the success of Star TV, Indian entrepreneurs have likewise established transnational television networks. Networks such Zee TV, Sun TV, and Sahara One now provide a variety of programming in a variety of Indian languages to viewers around the world.

Similar patterns are found in Indian and Chinese music, publishing, and Internet media, where increasingly transnational creativity and circulation foster new cultural forms and new audience affiliations. Yet despite these trends, the globalization of communication still is discussed largely from a Western perspective, positioning Hollywood and New York at the center of analysis. Not only is power seen as emanating from the West to the rest but so too is cultural influence, with media seen as the conduit for Western notions of fashion, taste, politics, and modernity. Global media conglomerates—most of them based in the United States—are portrayed as engines of innovation worldwide, transforming the style, content, and administrative structures of local and national media systems that now must compete with their counterparts from afar. Interestingly, these presumptions have circulated for some time, stretching back as far as modernization theory in the 1950s and 1960s, when it was suggested that exposure to mass media from the West would democratize nations and modernize the economies of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East.

Just as influential was the critical counterpart to these arguments, commonly characterized as the media imperialism school, an approach that grew influential during the 1970s by positing that Western media subject populations around the world to an increasingly homogenized set of values that serve the interests of Western capitalist institutions. According to this

critique, subordinate countries come to embrace Western media and the values they promote, such as individualism, consumerism, and commodity exchange. Rather than uniting people for positive social change, media imperialism fosters an exploitative global system that offers few opportunities for genuine advancement.

The essays in this volume challenge these approaches, not because they are wholly inaccurate but rather because Western media are now only one element in the increasingly complex global communication order and the movement of content is increasingly multidirectional. Although Hollywood—and the West more generally—are indeed influential forces, we wish to shift attention to other centers of production and other patterns of flow. We are interested in the fact that globalization is not a singular phenomenon that is characterized by cultural homogenization but is rather a trajectory of change that is bringing about new patterns of interconnection and interdependence that are multiple and complex. Since the 1500s, Western images and ideas have indeed circulated far and wide, but today "Chinese" and "Indian" songs, stories, and information flow through communication circuits around the world aimed both at migrant populations and cosmopolitan audiences, enabling new patterns of discussion and exchange. These new flows of imagery are substantially different from the cultural expropriations of the past, when Western powers mined traditional societies for artifacts to serve their own imperial purposes. Such Orientalist projects of the past were explicit and intentional exercises of centralized power that aimed to construct representations of both the modern colonizer and the colorful colonized other. Today, by comparison, the volume and velocity of cultural flows have increased, and the institutions that produce and circulate popular narratives have multiplied. Consequently, new patterns of flow and new relations of influence have emerged in the global cultural economy. Media conglomerates such as News Corporation may have imperial pretensions of their own and may generate billions of dollars in revenue, but, for example, the Indian movie industry serves far more customers in any given year and the Chinese popular music industry reaches far more ears, not just in Asia but worldwide. This is not to say these media are more powerful or more wonderful but rather to suggest that they are worthy of investigation on their own terms.

Furthermore, the social impacts of these media merit attention, since they have helped to foster new values and expectations among their viewers, forcing governments to pay attention to the changing patterns of cultural

exchange within nations and across national boundaries. For example, during the SARS crisis of 2003, many citizens of the People's Republic of China were getting their news about the pandemic from Internet sites maintained by Chinese newspapers in Vancouver, London, and Hong Kong. These transnational flows then engendered unauthorized subnational flows within the mainland, as online discussion proliferated and other media chimed in. Within weeks, Chinese officials were forced to reverse their policies and acknowledge the inadequacy of the government's initial response to the crisis. This is but one example of the multiple and complex patterns of media circulation that are increasingly common today, and one that had very little to do with Western media institutions.

When we began this project, we were surprised to find that little had been published regarding the globalization of Indian and Chinese media. Investigation of the popular press turned up some provocative essays, but few authors systematically considered Indian or Chinese media outside of national frameworks or connected their analysis of transnational media flows to larger questions regarding social and cultural change. This is precisely the terrain we hope to stake out in *Reorienting Global Communication*. Our title suggests that we're questioning the cultural presumptions of Orientalism and at the same time presenting a volume of alternative perspectives, hoping to shift or perhaps multiply the starting points for discussions of media and globalization. On the one hand, we wish to disrupt prevailing hierarchies of knowledge so as to privilege that which has been suppressed and thereby reorient the discussion of contemporary media. On the other hand, we believe that attention to the Chinese and Indian spheres of transnational circulation bring into focus a host of issues and dynamics that so far have received little attention. In that sense, we wish to reorient perceptions of cultural flow, offering an alternative mapping of the globe. Critical geographers and postcolonial scholars have sometimes tinkered with Mercator projections that are commonly used to map the world, suggesting other ways of representing geophysical and political relations. Likewise, the chapters in this volume rethink conventional representations of media, suggesting new ways of seeing worldwide patterns of cultural production and exchange.

We focus on globalization because we live in an era where social relations stretch further across space, so that new spheres of activity emerge and existing spheres—domestic, local, and national—are, as Anthony Giddens suggests, interpenetrated by forces from afar. Our project invites an exploration of the ways in which global media are remaking human consciousness

in far-flung localities as well as an examination of the structuring forces that shape this process, such as market relations and capital flows. Numerous scholars from diverse perspectives agree that capital organizes the world into centers and peripheries, but too often, the centers are always Euro-American and much of Asia is situated on the periphery. Our project complicates this perspective by examining media institutions and texts that are often overlooked by scholars and by examining the ways in which transnational popular culture provides resources for everyday living and for collective social action. Our interest in globalization does not mean we are leaving the nation-state behind—but neither do we privilege the nation-state, as do most projects in media studies. Moreover, we do not presume that global media relations today can be explained by center–periphery theories from yesteryear. Instead, we wish to embrace prior concerns about media influence by exploring new and intricate patterns of cultural flow and increasingly complex plays of power.

We furthermore aim to elevate the visibility of scholarship about two of the world's largest sociocultural formations, India and China. At the national level, population figures and manufacturing growth are often used to justify attention to these two countries; just as importantly, both countries offer lessons regarding the legacies of colonialism and the enduring power relations of the world system. As they reemerge in positions of world leadership, many observers refer to them as sleeping giants that will influence many aspects of society and culture during the twenty-first century, from energy to ecology to global governance. Likewise, India and China are considered regional leaders, having important and enduring links to such countries as Malaysia, Pakistan, and Uganda where significant populations identify themselves as Indian or Chinese, and where civilizational influences—legends, languages, and religious practices—signify connections that stretch across national boundaries. Moreover, India and China deserve attention because in many ways they represent the return of the repressed, engendering anxieties in the West that have led to brazen attempts to manage and contain them. Such struggles deserve attention, as do the presumptions of civilizational coherence that invite us to perceive India, China, and the West as intelligible and opposed entities.

Additionally, we focus on India and China because they both have been shaped by legacies of colonialism and state socialism. Radically different in their histories and institutions, both countries began experimenting with liberalization of their economies during the 1980s and have subsequently

been swept into the tide of trade liberalization, with each becoming an important node on the global assembly line. No longer able to manage their economies internally, they likewise face challenges in the realm of communication, knowing that there may be no road back to a sense of confident, bounded control over the expectations and aspirations of their populations. Their attempts to manage this tumultuous transition have raised numerous concerns regarding creativity, free expression, and cultural identity. Lacking a stable set of external boundaries, both countries are furthermore so vast and diverse that they are experiencing significant internal tensions among and between groups. They are also undergoing noteworthy changes in household economies, gender relations, and generational aspirations. At almost every level—domestic, local, national, and transnational—questions and challenges arise; among the most telling is: What does it mean to be Chinese? or, What does it mean to be Indian?

Within this context of shifting cultural identities, we are keenly interested in media and democracy in the broadest sense. In the case of India, for example, media-intensive electoral politics provide the government with a stamp of legitimacy as it seeks to forge policy on a wide range of pressing issues, such as resource management, women's rights, and the political status of Indians in the diaspora. Meanwhile in China, the single-party state struggles with pressure to loosen its control of the cultural and political realms, while economic institutions grope toward global standards of market transparency. Both China and India in their own ways have been experimenting with degrees of freedom for domestic media and with incorporating foreign media into the mix of available services. This new cultural environment has implications regarding not only the range of available content and the directions of flow but also regarding the ways that media users interact. Debates about "homeland," diaspora, and political efficacy mix with reflections and anxieties regarding location and identity within a very complex transnational cultural geography.

Thus, we acknowledge the importance of formal politics but we also include under the rubric of democracy our interest in the dynamics of inclusion in and exclusion from the cultural formations of "China" and "India" as they intersect with broader questions about transnational flows of media, money, and people. We furthermore interrogate the nature of democracy itself in a world where Indians and Chinese are not contained within singular state boundaries. How does one conceptualize democracy, both in the formal sense and the expanded sense we employ here, within a transnational con-

text? Those designated as Non-Resident Indians may participate in "home-land" politics by sending money and by lobbying foreign institutions and politicians on behalf of India. Yet, their permanent homes—economically and culturally—are outside the subcontinent. Diasporic media may create a transnational sense of cultural connection to "home" through the idioms of Bollywood, but how do diasporic communities of Indians imagine themselves politically in their locations outside India?

This volume furthermore seeks to explore debates regarding "ideological contamination" and "cultural pollution" within the nations themselves, within migrant communities, and across diverse localities. The intensity of these concerns seems directly related to the fact that Indian and Chinese media are making ever more expansive use of global forms and formats in order to produce their own hybrid popular products. As a result, claims to cultural authenticity grow ever more tenuous, as anxieties and tensions continue to mount, especially among the middle class who most enthusiastically embrace hybrid cultural forms and who are most likely to travel or migrate. With their societies in motion and their perspectives increasingly cosmopolitan, many nevertheless reach for the flotsam of "Indianness" or "Chineseness," even if these identities may be illusory. How, then, might we locate India and China? Where are the centers of these "civilizations" when the margins have grown so influential? Are these indeed "ungrounded empires?" Do migrations shape contemporary notions of Indianness and Chineseness as much as the exertions and assertions of the nation-state?

Migrations are notoriously difficult to characterize, but "Indian" and "Chinese" diasporas are arguably the world's largest. Though specific conditions vary enormously, Indian and Chinese migrants in many parts of the world resist integration by settling in distinctive neighborhood enclaves, setting up their own schools and health-care institutions, and establishing media that cater to their linguistic and community needs. Often, such practices generate anxiety and fear among locals. In some cases, Indian and Chinese migrants are reviled for their economic success as well as their perceived clannishness. Interestingly, both India and China now energetically claim these migrant populations as their own, hoping to share their success and foster a return flow of innovations and resources. Our focus on these migrants and the cultural connections that sustain them helps to explain as much about transnational formations as it does about the meaning of India and China today. States, homelands, and other imaginary terrains have now been joined by transnational imaginaries that are being put to use by various

interests and groups. Media companies are among those who have come to recognize that Indian and Chinese migrant populations may be smaller in number than those in the homeland, but they are avid users of contemporary media and therefore represent important markets.

These diasporas represent not only new markets for media institutions based in the home country that are reimagining themselves as global operators, they also represent resources for politicians who covet the expatriates' money, expertise, prestige, and mobility. Yet interestingly, the migrant who is now hailed as a national hero often constructs a view of "home" based on the media imagery that may bear little relation to the current realities of his or her country of origin. Indeed, the home countries have for many migrants become an imaginary other and therefore relations that have stretched out over space bring to the fore new tensions and contradictions as well as possibilities. Transnational media flows therefore figure prominently in characterizations of what it means to be Indian or Chinese and how that bears on conceptions of the modern states and institutions.

Finally, we direct our attention to India and China because both have significant and distinctive cultural resources: talent, mythologies, and conventions of representation. The religious iconography and traditional folk performances of India have woven their way into movies and music videos, influencing not only contemporary national media but also media in other parts of the world. Likewise, Chinese legends and operatic performance styles infuse the modern martial arts cinema, engendering stylized action-fantasy sequences that have been borrowed by film and television producers around the world. Indian and Chinese media institutions also present interesting case examples and contrasts. Overseas Chinese have operated freewheeling capitalist movie enterprises for almost a century in locations as diverse as Hong Kong, Singapore, and Kuala Lumpur. Meanwhile, media in Mainland China have for more than fifty years been tied tightly to the state and now struggle to discover institutional forms that are both ideologically acceptable and commercially viable. As for Indian media, they too have a tradition of state intervention that is now morphing into state–corporate partnerships in the face of challenges posed by globalization. MTV, for example, not only delivers a cable/satellite service to the subcontinent, it also refashions its South Asian programming for audiences in New York and London. Meanwhile, Zee TV, India's first commercial Hindi-language network, now produces programs for audiences in Europe, North America, and the Middle East, as well as audiences across the subcontinent. Such complexities beg

for analyses that interrogate issues of affinity, affect, and power, as well as textual and industrial practice. Accordingly, we have gathered a collection of essays that range across methodologies and theoretical approaches.

When we began to assemble this anthology, we wrestled with various ways to organize the essays. Our original hope was that we might come up with direct connections and affinities between Chinese and Indian media. We thought we might interweave essays about Indian and Chinese media in an evocative manner. We came to see, however, that connections would not be drawn between particular essays so much as between the collective reflections on each realm of transnational culture. That is, the stories of Indian and Chinese media are indeed related, but they are also distinctive, and the essays in the volume reflect those distinctions. Our scholars of Indian media expend a great deal of energy reflecting on the role that the Indian diaspora is playing in media, politics, and culture. Meanwhile, our scholars of Chinese media focus on the role of resurgent nationalism in the increasingly globalized and commercialized realm of Chinese popular culture. Thus, the emphasis differs between the two spheres but, as we shall see, the essays converge around the play between national and global forces and cultural forms.

In chapter 1, Lakshmi Srinivas shows how the growing wealth and prominence of expatriate Indian populations have come to influence the narrative strategies in Hindi-language movies. She contends that since the 1990s, movies produced by Mumbai studios have come to feature a structure of feeling that has less to do with India as a particular place than with a conception of "traditional" social, cultural, and gender relations. Aswin Punathambekar affirms this interpretation in chapter 2 with his study of Indian movie audiences in the United States. He shows how Bollywood films have become cultural unifiers for expatriate populations, but they have also become one of the means by which the state has laid claim to the loyalties and economic resources of so-called Non-Resident Indian (NRI) populations. Both Srinivas and Punathambekar argue that the figure of a "national family" looms large in these transnational texts.

Yet movies aren't the only sites where we find cultural nationalism at work. The online world has exploded with activity among those who consider themselves culturally connected to India. In chapter 3, Madhavi Mallapragada explores the realm of "desktop deities," religious sites that cater to those who are distant from temples and other sacred locations but long to maintain their connections to a spiritual home. Certainly, expatriate populations

figure prominently among those who turn to religious solace online—but one also finds second- and third-generation immigrants expressing nostalgia for a home they never knew. The growing prominence of expatriates and their offspring in deliberations about Indian identity also plays out in the world of fashion where wedding plans increasingly revolve around a mixing of Indian and other cultural influences. As Sujata Moorti shows in chapter 4, wedding magazines fuel a copious flow of images and ideas about matrimony, family, and femininity. Whether the wedding is to be staged in India or abroad, planners tap into a common pool of advice and discussion so that the resulting event becomes both a familial ritual and a meditation on what it means to be Indian in a globalizing era.

Behind these cultural phenomena lie the increasingly globalized calculations of Indian media industries. Much attention has been paid to Hindi-language media businesses in Mumbai, but as Shanti Kumar argues in chapter 5, others are globalizing as well. In Andhra Pradesh, Telegu-language media have proliferated since the 1990s and Eenadu media is one of the leaders. Beginning first with publishing and then moving on to film and television, Ramoji Rao has built a media empire that now rivals the scale of its Hindi-language counterparts. Not only has Rao built a massive studio that draws producers and projects from around the world, but he has also extended his reach to audiences worldwide via satellite television. In chapter 6, Divya McMillin elaborates on this trend by delineating the major players in Indian satellite television. Commercial enterprises such as Hindi-language Zee TV and Tamil-language Sun TV now transmit to transnational audiences in South Asia, Europe, Africa, Australia, and North America. Just as interestingly, Doordarshan—the state-owned public service television network that monopolized Indian television before the 1990s—now competes for audiences at home *and* abroad.

This growing emphasis on global India has disrupted prior notions of locality, as Sreya Mitra demonstrates in chapter 7. During the latter half of the twentieth century, the city of Bombay was represented in Hindi-language movies as India's generic big city, a magnet to migrant populations who left the countryside in search of their dreams. For pan-Indian audiences, Bombay came to embody the promise of Nehruvian modernity. Since the 1990s, however, foreign cities such as London and Sydney have become common settings for Bollywood narratives aimed at NRI audiences. Mitra argues that this shift in Bombay's cultural status has opened the door to movies that reflect upon the specific identity of the city that is now called Mumbai.

As with their Indian counterparts, Chinese media are experiencing contradictory pressures and opportunities of globalization. In chapter 8, Yuezhi Zhao describes the emergence of the global Chinese blockbuster movie, showing how economic liberalization in the People's Republic of China has made it possible for global capital and Hollywood studios to play a role in the production of transnational movie projects. *Hero* provides an example of this trend, but it also shows that the state's interest in cinema still plays a major role in such projects. *Hero* is at once a visual spectacle and a historical allegory regarding the value of centralized authoritarian rule. Zhao argues that the film implicitly endorses both the supremacy of the Chinese state and the legitimacy of global neoliberal capitalism. Such paradoxes operate at many levels of the Chinese movie business. As Emilie Yeh explains in chapter 9, "marketization"—a market-oriented managerial approach—has reconnected the mainland with capitalist economies of Asia, but it is an uneasy communion. Movie companies across the region are seeking transnational partnerships and market access, but they find that the price demanded by the PRC is often unreasonably high. Insider deal-making, political privilege, and a lack of transparency undermine potential business and creative ventures in Mainland China. Movie companies from Hong Kong or Seoul find that although the PRC market is a necessary component of their transnational strategies, it is nevertheless fraught with uncertainty and risk.

Yet despite these problems, media in the PRC are undergoing profound changes as they engage with institutional and cultural counterparts from around the world. Joseph Chan explores this dynamic in chapter 10, showing how the structure and practices of the television industry manifest traces of the global at a variety of levels. Although the project of media commercialization has not been fully realized in the PRC, media institutions have adapted to many of the transnational conventions of the industry. As Chan demonstrates, some influence comes from the West, but more substantially, the PRC participates in the television economy of East Asia, drawing upon resources and inspiration from Hong Kong, Taipei, Seoul, and Tokyo.

These transborder flows are also the focus of Chua Beng Huat's discussion of East Asian popular culture in chapter 11, only he focuses specifically at the textual level, showing how film, music, and television trends wend their way across borders and among audiences throughout the region. Writing from Singapore, Chua reflects on the emergence of what he refers to as "Pop Culture China," a realm of cultural exchange that exhibits the active exchange of popular artists and trends. It furthermore engages regularly with

cultural influences from Korea, Japan, and other Asian countries. Although this is not an entirely novel development, the speed and intensity of exchange has escalated since the 1990s and has developed into what Chua sees as a nascent East Asian cultural formation.

It is perhaps as a result of these influences that government leaders in Beijing fret about the erosion of their political and cultural authority. Television programs in the PRC often exhibit a tension between the expansive aspirations of global China and the pervasive anxieties about "authentic" Chinese identity. As Zhongdang Pan explains in chapter 12, the annual Spring Festival staged each year by the national CCTV network strives to incorporate viewers into a familial view of the nation, acknowledging differences while also advancing a rhetoric of collective national destiny in an era of globalization. In chapter 13, Chin-Chuan Lee picks up this thread, showing how the discourse of *Global Times*, China's leading foreign-policy newspaper, deliberates upon the state's ambition to rise to the status of a global superpower. Of central concern are China's post–Cold War relations with the United States. What does it mean for China to share the global stage with its old nemesis? Implicit in these debates are both an emergent cosmopolitanism and a resurgent strain of nationalism.

This pattern emerges as well in Jack Qiu's account of Chinese Internet policy in chapter 14. Having developed since the 1990s into the world's leading location for electronics manufacturing, China now aims to upgrade its status from workshop of the world to that of global design center and Internet innovator. Consequently, the state has fostered technology standards that compete directly with Western counterparts, hoping to capture a share of the licensing income that has swelled the coffers of Silicon Valley. Yet in this struggle for global leadership, the state not only must confront its overseas competitors but also must manage a powerful strain of technonationalism among Chinese Internet users who have become increasingly vociferous and influential.

Taken together, these essays exhibit many of the paradoxes of globalization. As media flow more freely across national borders, textual representations and institutional practices do indeed begin to share similarities, but those similarities exist in contrast with the enduring specificity of local and national contexts. Moreover, as media look outward, they offer a pretext for reflections on these differences and often lead to impassioned debates about societal and cultural essences. What does it mean to be Indian or Chinese? To be here or there? To be of the nation or outside the nation? Globalization

brings new images and ideas from afar, helping to broaden perspectives and engender new ways of thinking, but it also disrupts prevailing social relations and fosters fresh anxieties at home. By moving outside the prevailing Western perspective, these essays persuasively delineate alternative paths to media globalization.

PART ONE

Global India Media